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ABSTRACT 
The United States followed a path of initially giving little protection 
to intellectual property (IP) so that the country could benefit from the IP 
of nations we term earlier-movers on the world stage of economic 
development. This symposium piece argues that Japan and China have 
been following a similar trajectory in their intellectual property laws 
while progressing on their own economic climb. Widespread 
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Professor of Law, and Founding Director
of the Center for Intellectual Property Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University; 
Yale Law School, J.D.; Yale University, B.A.  
** Assistant Professor, School of Political Science and Public Administration, Shandong University; 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Ph.D.; University of Gothenburg, M.Sc.; Yale University, 
B.A. We would like to thank the participants of the 2018 Annual Akron Law IP Scholars Forum, of 
the 2019 Tri-State Region Intellectual Property Workshop at the New York University School of Law, 
and of the First Hofstra Scholars Roundtable. We are also grateful to the Maurice A. Deane School 
of Law and the Waseda University School of Law for institutional support. 
1
Manta and Ottervik: IP and Knowledge Transfer
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
878 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:877 
international outsourcing of manufacturing has made intellectual 
property a key asset for private companies, which has strengthened the 
tendencies of earlier-movers to formulate and enforce strict intellectual 
property laws. This suggests that countries like China respond not only to 
pressure from earlier-movers like the United States to increase 
intellectual property protection, but are also driven by concerns against 
their own later-movers. Perhaps curiously, if the hierarchy of movers 
shifts and the relative interest in intellectual property enforcement does 
as well, China will someday seek to protect its goods against infringement 
by the likes of the United States and Japan. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On World Intellectual Property Day, we not only celebrate invention and 
innovation, but also we recognize how integral intellectual property 
rights are to our Nation’s economic competitiveness. Intellectual 
property rights support the arts, sciences, and technology. They also 
create the framework for a competitive market that leads to higher wages 
and more jobs for everyone. The United States is committed to 
protecting the intellectual property rights of our companies and ensuring 
a level playing field in the world economy for our Nation’s creators, 
inventors, and entrepreneurs.1 
Intellectual property is commonly argued to be a source of economic 
competitiveness, and its protection is critically important to those 
countries that perceive themselves as having an economic and 
technological edge. Indeed, intellectual property protection allows earlier-
movers (those who through previous scientific or technological 
innovation have an edge over competitors) to maintain their advantage 
vis-à-vis later-movers (those who seek to catch up to and overtake earlier-
movers). However, historically most scientific or technological 
innovations of import have—even in the face of penalty of death—been 
transferred to and critically improved upon by later-movers. Earlier-
movers have a tendency to become overtaken by later-movers that learn 
from and improve upon the knowledge of earlier-movers. From the 
perspective of countries’ economic competitiveness, the danger of 
knowledge transfer stems not from the prospect of unfair competition but, 
in the long run, from the possibility that the recipient might overtake the 
1. The White House, Proclamation, President Donald J. Trump Proclaims April 26, 2018, as
World Intellectual Property Day, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-proclaims-april-26-2018-world-intellectual-property-
day/ [https://perma.cc/VUX5-AMV2]. 
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source by innovating on the knowledge transferred. Countries that have 
the earlier-mover advantage in some domain have a strong incentive to 
protect their intellectual property against later-movers at any one point in 
time. That said, to the extent that a country is concerned with maintaining 
a perceived economic or technical lead, intellectual property protection is 
only one element of a larger strategy that must emphasize intellectual 
property production. Intellectual property protection safeguards past 
innovation, but future innovation requires continuous intellectual property 
production that necessitates more than just a solid intellectual property 
legal framework. 
Countries’ views toward and willingness to enact as well as enforce 
intellectual property laws often track their level of not just absolute but 
also relative economic development, as illustrated by the examples of the 
United States, Japan, and recently, China. All three countries realized 
rapid economic growth by first building the human and physical 
infrastructure needed to sustain growth, and then, selectively, by hook or 
by crook, learning from other countries. As these countries began to 
overtake competitors economically and technically, their intellectual 
property protection laws became increasingly strict and severe. With 
economic growth, countries that previously acted as industrial spies and 
infringers of others’ intellectual property seem to become stalwart 
defenders and maintainers of (their own) intellectual property rights. 
The Trump Administration’s full-court press against what it argues 
to be unfair competition from China—one prong of which is vociferous 
U.S. government complaints of intellectual property infringement—
makes the question of what role intellectual property plays in economic 
competitiveness not only academically interesting but also highly salient. 
The basic argument by the Administration seems to be that American 
economic competitiveness vis-à-vis China can be maintained by 
strengthening intellectual property protection. This argument rests on the 
assumption that China is a copycat that on balance infringes more on 
others’ intellectual property than it creates. The situation may be shifting, 
and the argument overlooks the decades-long investment-driven rise of 
China. Currently, and going forward, China might in fact be producing 
more intellectual property of certain types than the United States and 
protecting it through an increasingly robust legal system. This has far-
reaching consequences both for the United States and China. To explore 
these consequences, this symposium piece analyzes the relationship 
between intellectual property and economic development over time in 
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general, as well as specifically in the cases of the United States, Japan, 
and China.2 
Part II presents the idea of earlier-mover and later-mover advantages 
as applied to intellectual property and economic development. The earlier-
mover advantage is the technological and economic competitive 
advantage that a company or country has vis-à-vis its competitors by 
virtue of relative temporal precedence. The compound nature of economic 
growth and the importance of earlier inventions for later ones mean that 
being earlier in seeing rapid, or even comparatively high, economic 
growth and technological development pays dividends over long periods 
of time. Being a later-mover provides its own set of advantages, not least 
of which is the possibility of leapfrogging the earlier-mover by skipping 
intermediate steps. We use the terms earlier-mover (rather than first- or 
early-mover) and later-mover (rather than second- or late-mover) because 
this piece describes countries’ positions relative to each other, which can 
vary over time. The West in general, and the United States in particular, 
has for decades had the earlier-mover advantage. East Asia in general, and 
China in particular, has shown how the later-mover advantage can be 
exploited with the right policy package. 
Part III analyzes three cases of economic development—those of the 
United States, Japan, and China—and its relationship with infringement, 
production, and protection of intellectual property. In the past decades, the 
first two countries have been earlier-movers with a clear economic and 
technological advantage over later-movers. However, all three countries 
have a history of being classified as later-movers: the United States vis-à-
vis Great Britain and Europe; Japan vis-à-vis the United States and the 
West; and China vis-à-vis the United States, the West, and Japan. In the 
cases of the United States and Japan, flagrant initial intellectual property 
infringement along with a more (for Japan) or less (for the United States) 
purposeful investment in intellectual property production led to economic 
growth and increasingly stringent intellectual property protection. 
Aggressive and successful exploitation of the later-mover advantage over 
time led both the United States and Japan to equally assertively protect 
2. Intellectual property covers a large swath of intangible property, and it is used here in the
same sense as indicated in the March 22, 2018 Report of the United States Trade Representative on 
China. That is to say, it covers the legally protected know-how that undergirds a modern economy, 
i.e., “patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets.” OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology 
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, at 6 
(March 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://
perma.cc/N23A-KBLQ]. Relatedly, when not qualified, development in this symposium piece refers 
to social and economic development. 
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their—at times arguably ill-begotten—earlier-mover advantage as they 
out-grew and out-innovated those upon whose intellectual property they 
had initially infringed. China has so far followed closely in the footsteps 
of both the United States and especially Japan, allegedly infringing on the 
intellectual property of earlier-movers, significantly investing in domestic 
intellectual property production, and building a comprehensive 
framework for protecting intellectual property. A future where China 
expects the same protection of its intellectual property that former earlier-
movers demanded from it might not be far off. 
Part IV builds on the previous parts and presents the argument that 
while intellectual property protection is important, production (which 
depends heavily on many factors outside the legal framework) is equally 
if not more important. Intellectual property protection alone will not allow 
any country to maintain an edge vis-à-vis other countries. Historically, 
with the possible exception of Greek Fire, knowledge transfer has been 
inevitable even upon pain of death. What allowed some countries to gain 
and maintain economic competitiveness was their capacity to develop 
new science and technologies. If an emphasis on the protection of old 
intellectual property is not accompanied by policy initiatives to promote 
the production of innovative goods, such emphasis could prove to be 
highly disadvantageous. Furthermore, to the extent that intellectual 
property protections blunt the later-mover advantage, an ironclad global 
intellectual property regime is likely to make it harder for overtaken 
earlier-movers to catch up again once they become later-movers. 
II. EARLIER- AND LATER-MOVER ADVANTAGE
While the idea of earlier-mover and later-mover advantages is well-
established in the business world, the concept also holds in political 
economy. Being an earlier-mover pays dividends for a country over long 
periods of time because of the largely cumulative nature of scientific and 
technological progress, and the compound nature of economic growth. In 
fact, the best predictor of a country’s future development level is its past 
development level.3 However, history is replete with earlier-movers 
losing their edge to later-movers that first copy and then innovate. 
Being a later-mover provides its own set of advantages, not least of 
which is the possibility of leapfrogging the earlier-mover by skipping 
3. Mattias Ottervik, Gender and Progress: How Gender Equality Affects Long-Term Human
Development 48–49, Ph.D. thesis, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Government 
and Public Administration, 2017 (on file with authors). 
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intermediate steps.4 For example, it took almost four hundred years from 
the publication of William Gilberte’s De Magnete in 1600, which 
introduced the word electricity, to the creation of the integrated circuit by 
Texas Instruments. The earlier-mover advantage of the West allowed for 
its development of integrated circuits. The later-mover advantage consists 
of the short-circuiting (no pun intended) of centuries of piecemeal 
scientific progress. Non-Western integrated circuit designers and 
manufacturers do not have to start by working themselves up from the 
first principles of electricity; rather, these actors skip all intermediate 
steps. 
History is replete with examples of later-movers scientifically and 
economically overtaking earlier-movers. Almost all technical and 
scientific developments of note and import have invariably been spread. 
For most of history, knowledge transfer has been an immutable force.5 
The question then is not how to prevent it, but what is to be done given its 
inevitability. Because of the cumulative nature of scientific and 
technological development, the key question is how will each innovation 
be made the basis for the next, and who will the next innovator be? 
Movable type printing was critical for the progress and dissemination of 
science during the Western Renaissance and Enlightenment,6 but 
foundational to that was the comparatively cheap and sturdy paper 
invented in China.7 It is doubtful that movable type printing would have 
had the impact it did if Gutenberg had been forced to print on papyrus or 
parchment. Some of this diffusion of knowledge happened naturally (such 
as Indian numerals being adopted throughout the Middle East before 
making it to Europe), but most happened through more sordid means. For 
example, paper-making likely arrived in Europe by way of the Abbasid 
Caliphate’s capture of Chinese paper-makers at the Battle of Talas. 
While the Industrial Revolution was a period of rapid technical, 
economic, and scientific development across the West, its national 
foundation was laid not seldom through industrial espionage and 
4. See generally ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS (1962). 
5. George Basalla, The Spread of Western Science, 156 SCIENCE 611 (1967); Steven J. Harris,
Networks of Travel, Correspondence, and Exchange, in 3 CAMBRIDGE HIST. SCI. 341, 341 (Katharine 
Park & Lorraine Daston eds., 2006). 
6. See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE
46–101, 164–208 (1983). 
7. Susan O. Thompson, Paper Manufacturing and Early Books, 314 ANNALS N.Y. ACADEMY 
SCI. 167, 167 (1978). 
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intellectual property infringement.8 British entrepreneurs illegally copied 
Italian designs for mechanized silk-spinning, and then improved upon and 
used them to spin cotton, which had a significantly larger market.9 Later-
mover United States, in turn, encouraged the illicit, and according to 
British law, illegal transfer of knowledge to the United States. 
Entrepreneurs in the United States improved upon that knowledge, and its 
government over time became as forceful a proponent of protection of 
proprietary knowledge as had been Italy’s and Great Britain’s. Christoph 
Roser, describing the round-robin industrial espionage behind the creation 
of modern manufacturing across the West, summarizes it in the following 
way: 
It is easy to see analogies. Italian and British industrialists back then 
were probably as upset about the theft of intellectual property as modern 
industrialists are about technology theft. Similarly, modern China, on 
the receiving end of many modern-day transfers, is probably as snug as 
a bug about this gain as the United States or Germany was back then. In 
all cases, countermeasures were, at best, only able to slow down the 
knowledge transfers.10 
Proprietary knowledge was illicitly transferred between competitor 
nations throughout the Industrial Revolution like it had been in ages past. 
8. CHRISTOPH ROSER, “FASTER, BETTER, CHEAPER” IN THE HISTORY OF MANUFACTURING:
FROM THE STONE AGE TO LEAN MANUFACTURING AND BEYOND 110 (2017). 
9. Id. at 104–10.
10. Id. at 110.
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Figure 1. Human Development 1850–2010 
In modern times both Japan and China were quintessential later-
movers. When American gun-boats forcibly opened Japan, this set off a 
civil war whose victors formed the Meiji government and concluded that 
Japan was, in terms of wealth and power, about 40 years behind the West. 
The new Japanese government initiated a global fact-finding mission, the 
Iwakura Mission, which visited the most developed countries in the world 
to search for clues to their economic and military power. The lessons 
learned were immediately turned into social and economic policy. 
Judicious application of what it had learned from earlier-movers 
transformed Japan into an industrial power over the course of a 
generation. Similarly, at the founding of the People’s Republic, China was 
one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, and as its 
government set about improving quality of life for its citizens, it had its 
work cut out for it. However, China benefited from foreign examples to 
enhance its learning, and learn it did. Like their Japanese counterparts 
before them, Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese government scoured 
the world for the sort of practical knowledge that would allow China to 
realize rapid development. One way to quantify just how far behind Japan 
and China were at various points in time with regard to other countries is 
to compare their level of human development—a United Nations-created 
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composite measure of education, health, and material welfare.11 As shown 
in Figure 1,12 in terms of human development both Japan and China were 
able to realize rapid improvements: in the case of Japan allowing it to 
catch up to earlier-mover United States, and in the case of China going 
from being one of the least developed to one of the more developed 
countries in the world. 
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT
By making some knowledge proprietary, legal protection, at least in 
theory, offers an effective mechanism of blunting the later-mover 
advantage in the short term. In the case of the United States, it allowed 
companies to transfer manufacturing know-how to developing countries 
like China while still retaining a sense of ownership. Production could be 
outsourced because there was, in theory at least, little fear that 
manufacturers would turn around and wholesale infringe on the 
intellectual property rights of their customers. The lack of fear was 
justified for two reasons. First, most Western consumer brands sourced 
manufacturing or design expertise from other companies, an arrangement 
that would not have been possible without intellectual property protection. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, as long as the outsourcing 
companies had an innovation pipeline (not seldom fed by past public 
investments), manufacturing was not a key part of the value chain. In the 
case of the U.S., it had ARPANET, the progenitor of the modern 
internet,13 and the space program, which led to the development of 
integrated circuits. These public investments—especially when paired 
with world-class universities attracting students from all over the world 
who often stayed in the U.S—paid dividends decades after they were 
made and led to the creation of companies like Apple, Microsoft, and Dell, 
and to the 1990s economic boom in the United States.14 It took Japan 30 
11. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, 9–
16 (1990), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/219/hdr_1990_en_complete_nostats.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2CXD-SXZ4]. 
12. Leandro Prados de la Escosura, World Human Development: 1870-2007, 61 REV. INCOME
& WEALTH 220, 230, 234 (2015) (presenting data for Figure 1 from HIHD columns in Table 1 and 
Table 2); Ottervik, supra note 3, at 105–07. 
13. ARPANET was funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States
Department of Defense. WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS: HOW A GROUP OF HACKERS, 
GENIUSES, AND GEEKS CREATED THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 235–37 (2014). 
14. Paul Ceruzzi, Apollo Guidance Computer and the First Silicon Chips, SMITHSONIAN AIR
& SPACE MUSEUM https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/apollo-guidance-computer-and-first-
silicon-chips [https://perma.cc/PAC4-L6VV]; see generally Timothy Sturgeon, How Silicon Valley 
Came to Be, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL 
9
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years to grant a patent on the integrated circuit,15 which allowed for 
infringement of American intellectual property in the meantime. 
Nevertheless, the innovation pipeline in the United States in general and 
Silicon Valley in particular enabled American companies to dominate the 
first decades of the computer revolution.16 The United States, while the 
cradle of this revolution, may be losing its edge in that area, though. 
There appears to be a significant change in the relative 
innovativeness of the United States and China. The latter has frequently 
globally been viewed as the most significant intellectual property thief 
that reaps where it has not sown.17 China has long been seen as both a 
mass manufacturer and significant consumer of goods that infringes upon 
every area of intellectual property law, be it patents, copyright, 
trademarks, or trade secrets. In recent years, however, China has taken 
measures such as to reduce problems previously associated with “local 
judicial protectionism: challenges in obtaining evidence[;] small damage 
awards[;] and a perceived bias against foreign firms.”18 In significant part, 
this change is being driven by both a maturation of the Chinese judicial 
system and the fact that China is now, like the United States and Japan 
before it, producing too much valuable intellectual property not to protect 
it. 
REGION 15–47 (Martin Kenney ed., 2000); PAUL FREIBERGER & MICHAEL SWAINE, FIRE IN THE 
VALLEY: THE MAKING OF THE PERSONAL COMPUTER (2000).  
15. John C. Lindgren & Craig J. Yudell, Protecting American Intellectual Property in
Japan, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 7–9 (1994). 
16. Tracey Samuelson, How the U.S. Outgrew 1980s Trade Anxiety Over Japan,
MARKETPLACE para. 19 (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/11/29/economy/how-
us-outgrew-1980s-anxiety-over-japan [https://perma.cc/Y3WU-NLG6]. 
17. Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 525, 549 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Rise and Decline]; Peter Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic 
Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: 
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais 
ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]. See generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: 
Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); 
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO 
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006). 
18. See William Weightman, China’s Progress on Intellectual Property Rights (Yes, Really),
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 20, 2018), para. 4 https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-progress-on-intellectual-
property-rights-yes-really/ [https://perma.cc/RW2G-2286].  
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Figure 2. Patent Applications by Country of Origin 1980-2016 
As shown in Figure 2, in 2016, Chinese entities applied for as many 
patents as Japan and the United States combined.19 There is some reason 
to question the quality of Chinese patent applications,20 and the number 
of applications might be inflated by patent subsidy programs.21 That being 
said, while the overall number of patents may be inflated, the growth does 
reflect an increase in innovation.22 Supporting the idea that patent filings 
are showing an underlying change in innovation is that China is making 
rapid headway in broader measures of innovativeness such as the Global 
19. WIPO IP Statistics Data Center, WIPO, https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/ (last visited May
26, 2019) (WIPO statistics database tool used to pull data for Figure 2). 
20. Lulu Yilun Chen, China Claims More Patents Than Any Country—Most Are Worthless,
BLOOMBERG para. 3 (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-26/china-
claims-more-patents-than-any-country-most-are-worthless [https://perma.cc/PP2F-SMVU]. 
21. Jianwei Dang & Kazuyuki Motohashi, Patent Statistics: A Good Indicator for Innovation
in China? Patent Subsidy Program Impacts on Patent Quality, 35 CHINA ECON. REV. 137, 137 
(2015). 
22. Dan Prud’homme, Chinese Patent Quantity and Patent Quality, and the Role of the State,
in DAN PRUD’HOMME & TAOLUE ZHANG, EVALUATION OF CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME FOR INNOVATION, REPORT FOR THE WORLD BANK 65 (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3104260 [https://perma.cc/GU69-QTPG]. 
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Innovation Index shown in Figure 3.23 This is important for two reasons. 
First, foreign policy-makers have to drastically change their views of the 
world. For example, when Apple adjusted its earning guidance—largely 
based on poor sales in China—Larry Kudlow suggested that intellectual 
property infringement by Chinese phone manufacturers could explain the 
drop in sales.24 However, the thought of China as a source of only cheap, 
low-quality knock-offs is outdated. 
Figure 3. Global Innovation Index Rankings 2013-2018 
The second reason why the drastic increase in patent filings is 
important is that the cases of the United States and Japan suggest that 
countries’ views toward and willingness to enact as well as enforce 
intellectual property laws track their level of not just absolute, but also 
relative economic development. The United States was resistant to 
adopting strong protections during its early stages of development, 
wanting to borrow liberally from the fruits of earlier-movers like Great 
Britain. Japan reacted the same way, initially wishing to benefit from its 
23. Cornell University, INSEAD, & World Intellectual Property Organization, Global
Innovation Index 2018: Energizing the World with Innovation, WIPO (2018), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRL3-BQ3C].  
24. See Fred Imbert, White House Advisor Kudlow Says Apple Technology May Have Been
‘Picked off’ by China, CNBC para. 2 (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/04/white-house-
advisor-kudlow-says-apple-technology-may-have-been-picked-off-by-china.html 
[https://perma.cc/AX7E-DYJC]. 
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own earlier-mover, the United States, until it reached a certain level of 
wealth. Today, Japan’s intellectual property production is increasing at a 
rapid pace.25 Modern history is replete with examples where the United 
States and Japan agree and at times join forces when it comes to pushing 
for stronger intellectual property protections at both the national and 
international levels. The two countries emphasize intellectual property 
protections that weave together civil and criminal measures, and they 
advocate for the need for proper legal incentives for creation and 
invention. They both tend to favor a combination of greater sanctions and 
more powerful enforcement in the international arena, often clashing with 
countries that do not share the same priorities. China may have reached 
its own turning point as Chinese companies have begun to assert their 
patents against companies and competitors in other countries. While 
China may have historically responded to threats and obligations accepted 
under international treaties (and even then, far from the level that earlier-
movers expected to see), other motivations now seem to be driving the 
country’s behavior. 
A. Intellectual Property and Development in the United States 
The Founding Fathers understood the importance of including an 
intellectual property system as they were drafting the Constitution, and 
they specified in the Intellectual Property Clause of the document that 
Congress must have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”26 This 
language was drawn from England’s Statute of Anne, which has since 
become known as “the source of Anglo-American copyright law.”27 
That said, and while the United States became an innovation hub in 
modern history that sought to advocate for the enforcement of 
international standards against intellectual property piracy: 
In the nineteenth century, it was a post-colonial nation, its cultural life 
derivative and its economy underdeveloped [which] declined to 
participate in international copyright agreements. Only by the end of the 
25. See Bloomberg, Japan’s Intellectual Property Generating Revenue at Record Pace, JAPAN
TIMES para. 1 (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/16/business/economy-
business/japans-intellectual-property-generating-revenue-record-pace/#.W5AVq5NKiu4 
[https://perma.cc/676G-4BQ7] (noting that revenue from intellectual property increased by 74% over 
the previous five years and reached record heights in 2017).  
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities:
The Life of a Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427, 1427 (2010). 
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nineteenth century, after the United States had joined the ranks of the 
world’s major industrial powers, did the government adopt legislation 
protecting the intellectual property of non-U.S. citizens.28 
In that sense, there was some potential tension between the universalist, 
Enlightenment-motivated sentiments that the Founders enshrined in the 
Constitution versus the narrower interests in pre-Constitution state 
copyright laws and post-Constitution national copyright laws proposed 
and passed by other politicians.29 
The United States initially refused to grant copyright protection to 
foreign authors, which especially hurt English authors; indeed, “[b]etween 
1800 and 1860, almost half of the bestsellers in the United States were 
pirated mostly from English novels.”30 Some English authors (including 
Charles Dickens and Anthony Trollope) managed to get special 
protections such that American publishing houses promised not to publish 
“editions of a foreign work that w[ere] already the subject of an agreement 
between its author and another publishing house,” which enabled the 
authors to make money through so-called “courtesy copyright” even if 
they did not officially benefit from U.S. copyright laws.31 This system 
eventually failed, as did initial attempts at bilateral treaties between the 
United States and Great Britain.32 “Congress [ultimately] did not grant 
any protection to foreign authors until the 1870s,” which also resulted in 
American authors experiencing the same discrimination in foreign 
countries.33 
Other nations alleviated the problem associated with protecting 
foreign works by joining the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works in 1886, a step that the United States did not 
take for over a hundred years, namely until 1989.34 The importance of the 
Berne Convention cannot be overstated. It marked, to some, “the point at 
which the ramshackle and disorganized collection of bilateral treaties 
inevitably gave way to the rationality of a multilateral regime that 
28. Thomas Bender & David Sampliner, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American
Literature, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 255, 255 (1997) (citing AUBREY J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1960)). 
29. See id. at 258 n.11.
30. Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 17, at 534 (2012) (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 534–35 (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 535–36.
33. Id. at 537–38 (citations omitted).
34. For a discussion of the background and negotiations surrounding the Berne Convention,
see Daniel Gervais, Golan v. Holder: A Look at the Constraints Imposed by the Berne Convention, 
64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147, 147 (2011). 
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established common standards of copyright protection.”35 It was also a 
time of uniting the civil and common law traditions of copyright. Indeed, 
these traditions “were brought together (and simultaneously tainted) in a 
treaty which stipulated the minimum conditions that signatories had to 
comply with.”36 All this said, some scholars warn that the shape and 
membership of the Berne Convention in 1885 were in no way inevitable, 
but rather hinged on many political forces and contingencies.37 
In the twentieth century, “the increasing value of intellectual 
property [was accompanied by] rapid increase in legislative activity, and 
concomitant lobbying activity.”38 Robert Merges does not believe that 
lobbying needs to be a cause of concern per se because it is what one 
would expect when “intellectual property now constitutes a crucial set of 
corporate assets in the new information economy.”39 He acknowledges 
that “in some cases increased expenditures may be cause for concern. 
Both public choice theory and empirical evidence suggest that some types 
of intellectual property legislation may be prone to excessive private-
interest influence, or rent-seeking.”40 In his view, these examples include 
the extension of copyright terms (which he deems to be almost exclusively 
the result of such rent-seeking) and special protection when it comes to 
computer databases.41 
Patents provide a particularly interesting area of study in the 
intellectual property public choice landscape. Scholars who conducted 
empirical research on patent lobbying expenditures and congressional 
behavior concluded, for example, that: 
Congress does not have a point of view independent from the 
stakeholders in the patent system. Rather, their votes on the Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, reflect the participation and preferences 
of major stakeholders, such as the information technology industry, the 
pharmaceutical industry, the law associations, and the manufacturing 
sector.42 
35. Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Great Britain and the Signing of the Berne Convention in
1886, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 311, 311 (2001) (citations omitted). 
36. Id. at 312.
37. Id. at 339–40.
38. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–
2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2189 (2000). 
39. Id. at 2235.
40. Id. at 2236.
41. See id.
42. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1341, 1413 (2009). 
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This reflects a larger trend on the part of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological industries to advocate for stronger property rights, while 
large corporations specializing in software and information technology 
tend to prefer reduced protection.43 The large software and IT companies 
fear “becoming hostage to small companies’ patents” and thus favor less 
stringent enforcement.44 Given the flexibility of congressmen when it 
comes to their patent policy votes, any relative increases in power on the 
part of pro-patent entities can lead to legislative proposals to increase 
patent infringement sanctions and/or enforcement.45 
One of the mechanisms enabling proponents of stronger intellectual 
property protection is also that, generally speaking, once laws with 
relatively low penalties are passed, it can become comparatively easier to 
raise said sanctions over time.46 This has had dramatic effects especially 
in the copyright arena, where the law covered an increasing number of 
behaviors and toughened its sanctions, which included the use of statutory 
sanctions against large-scale file-sharers in ways that the drafters could 
have never predicted.47 This ratcheting effect did not encounter significant 
pushback from individual citizens and large media companies until the 
negative responses to the introduction of the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA) and Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and 
Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PIPA or PROTECT IP Act), which 
both sought to address to a greater degree online IP offenses.48 Around the 
same time, there was also public upheaval about the prosecution and 
suicide of internet activist and IP infringer Aaron Swartz.49 
The last decade has thus brought with it a level of popular attention 
to and intervention into copyright policy that was essentially 
unprecedented. Patent policy, on the other hand, is still largely driven by 
the views of the big players. Most individuals generally do not become 
embroiled in patent infringement, but—as is the case for trademark 
43. Id. at 1401.
44. Id. at 1370.
45. See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 512 (2011) [hereinafter Manta, Puzzle of Criminal 
Sanctions]. 
46. See Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 178 (2014).
47. See id. at 179–184.
48. Id. at 189–93.
49. See, e.g., Steven Musil, Researchers Honor Swartz’s Memory with PDF Protest, CNET
(Jan. 13, 2013), https://www.cnet.com/news/researchers-honor-swartzs-memory-with-pdf-protest/ 
[https://perma.cc/98E7-43WY]. 
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infringement—this could change if technologies like 3D printing become 
more widely used and present new risks to intellectual property owners.50 
The political landscape of American intellectual property law has 
generally been dominated by growth in value leading to a greater interest 
in protection. This expansion has not been entirely unbridled, as 
exemplified by safety valves such as the fair use doctrines in copyright 
and trademark law, or ultimately the broad pushback in the years leading 
up to and during the SOPA/PIPA Era. The large intellectual property 
owners have also had public relations limitations placed on them. For 
example, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) mostly 
ceased pursuing individual users after popular backlash and the RIAA’s 
expenditure of significant amounts of legal fees in exchange for little 
recovery.51 
In the international context, after it reached developmental parity 
with other nations and with few exceptions like its initial reluctance to 
join the Berne Convention, the United States has been one of the major 
advocates of stronger sanctions and greater enforcement because that is 
what it sees as promoting the interest of its intellectual property producers. 
Like international intellectual property scholar Graeme Dinwoodie has 
stated, “as the leading exporter of intellectual property in the world, the 
United States is a strong advocate for treaty membership and 
implementation.”52 Indeed, “[b]y the twentieth century, the United States 
was a leader in technological development and one of the world’s military 
and economic leadership superpowers,” which led in 1994 to its advocacy 
for the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS).53 One of the goals was to provide “a global disincentive 
to infringe patented products that were placed into the global stream of 
commerce.”54 
The trajectory of the United States’ role in treaty negotiation and 
adoption is not particularly subtle: At the beginning of the nation’s 
50. See Irina D. Manta, Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Innocence, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1745, 1780 (2015) (discussing this issue in the context of trademarks). 
51. See Manta, supra note 45, at 514 (citing Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha. RIAA Paid Its
Lawyers More Than $16,000,000 in 2008 to Recover Only $391,000!!!, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS 
THE PEOPLE (July 13, 2010), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-
ha-riaa-paid-its-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/GL5Q-TGWP]). 
52. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 233
(2002). 
53. Simone A. Rose, The Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision
of “Progress”?, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1220 (2013). 
54. Id. at 1221 (citing Todd Rowe, Global Technology Protection: Moving Past the Treaty, 4
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 138 (2000) (identifying this task as the key reason for American 
negotiators to work with foreign ones to reach international intellectual property agreements)). 
17
Manta and Ottervik: IP and Knowledge Transfer
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
894 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:877 
history, the United States’ role as an intellectual property consumer led to 
an appetite for free use of other countries’ works. As the United States 
developed economically and moved from being a later-mover to an 
earlier-mover, it began demanding that other countries respect the 
boundaries of its patented inventions, copyrighted works, and 
trademarked goods. It will likely continue to do so unless it experiences a 
tipping point in maintaining its pole position in the hierarchy of 
intellectual property producers. 
B. Intellectual Property and Development in Japan 
While the United States was arguably a later-mover in 
industrialization vis-à-vis Great Britain, Japan was an across-the-board 
later-mover when American gunboats under Matthew Perry forcibly 
opened its markets to the world in 1853 by pressuring Japan into a trade 
treaty with the United States. That treaty was quickly followed by a series 
of similar trade treaties with other Western powers. Already beset by 
numerous domestic challenges and general dynastic decline, the 
Tokugawa Shogunate did not survive the humiliation of the unequal 
treaties imposed upon it, and in 1868 the Shogunate was ended by the 
Meiji Restoration.55 Coming during a period of Tokugawa dynastic 
decline, the treaties galvanized young, reform-minded samurai to organize 
around the emperor to overthrow the Shogunate and to enact reforms that 
would safeguard Japan from the Western encroachment that Japan and 
other East Asian countries increasingly suffered. As one of its first acts, 
in 1871, the new Meiji government sent the Iwakura Mission to all 
Western countries with whom it had been compelled to sign treaties. Led 
by Tonomi Iwakura, the mission had three goals: to make goodwill visits 
with the fifteen heads of state with whom Japan had been forced into 
diplomatic relations; to sound out these foreign governments on the 
possibility of renegotiating the unequal treaties Japan had been compelled 
55. The Tokugawa Shogunate was the de jure feudal military government that ruled Japan
between 1603 and 1868. John Whitney Hall, Introduction, in 4 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN: 
EARLY MODERN JAPAN 4 (John Whitney Hall ed., 1991). See generally Joseph R. Strayer, The 
Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudalism, in STUDIES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF EARLY 
MODERN JAPAN (John Whitney Hall & Marius B. Jansen eds., 1968). The Meiji Restoration, enacted 
by the Meiji government that succeeded the Tokugawa Shogunate, was the series of political, social, 
and economic reforms that created modern Japan, turning it from a feudal country to an industrialized, 
developed country. Marius B. Jansen, Introduction, in 5 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN: THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 5 (Marius B. Jansen ed., 1989). See generally WILLIAM G. BEASLEY, THE 
MEIJI RESTORATION (1972); JOHN H. SAGERS, ORIGINS OF JAPANESE WEALTH AND POWER: 
RECONCILING CONFUCIANISM AND CAPITALISM, 1830–1885 (2006). 
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to sign in the aftermath of the Perry Expedition; and finally, “to learn 
firsthand about the West and ferret out its secrets for success.”56 
While it might seem a long time ago today, the Meiji era continues 
to be important for modern Japan, especially when considering postwar 
industrial policy and intellectual property laws. Industrial policy goes 
back to the Meiji era, as do the roots of the fabled Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry and its successor, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI).57 The Meiji Restoration also illustrates the level of 
institutional transformation required to successfully industrialize, and the 
comprehensive knowledge transfer that informed that institutional 
transformation. 
The Iwakura Mission represents one of the most important and most 
organized campaigns of knowledge transfer in modern history. The 
Mission was assisted in its many ports of call by Japanese nationals who 
were sent out by the Meiji government to study in the West.58 After 
quickly concluding meetings with the officials of host governments, the 
Mission spread out to study the political, economic, and social systems of 
the countries it visited. Its members were animated by two questions: 
First . . . . How did the West come to arrive at its contemporary 
condition? To what, that is, could one attribute the wealth, power, and 
cultural achievements that seemed so evident everywhere in the United 
States and Europe. Second, how might the island nation of Japan . . . 
shape its own quest for modernity so that it too might enter the ranks of 
the world’s advanced nations.59 
Over the course of two years of close study of the West, the Japanese 
missioners found that the wealth and power they observed was the product 
of a specific historical process which had given the West a significant lead 
over Japan. However, that lead appeared to be only of some 40 years, and 
it could be closed and overcome with the right policies.60 One critical way 
in which that gap could be closed would be through education: 
56. JAMES L. MCCLAIN, JAPAN: A MODERN HISTORY 202 (2002) [hereinafter MCCLAIN,
MODERN HISTORY]. 
57. CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL
POLICY, 1925–1975 31, 81-111 (1984). 
58. Ian Nish, Introduction, in THE IWAKURA MISSION IN AMERICA & EUROPE: A NEW
ASSESSMENT 6–8 (Ian Nish ed., 1998). 
59. MCCLAIN, MODERN HISTORY, supra note 56, at 173.
60. Marlene J. Mayo, Rationality in the Meiji Restoration: The Iwakura Embassy, in MODERN 
JAPANESE LEADERSHIP: TRANSITION AND CHANGE 357–58 (Bernard S. Silberman & H.D. 
Harootunian eds., 1966).  
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We clearly must have schools if we are to encourage our country’s 
development as a civilized country, improve ordinary people’s 
knowledge, establish the power of the state, and maintain our 
independence and sovereignty. . . . Our people are no different from the 
Americans or Europeans of today: it is all a matter of education or lack 
of education.61 
The conclusion was that of the many reforms the Meiji government had 
to make, education was among the most important. Already in 1872, 
before the end of the Iwakura Mission, the Meiji government created a 
modern school system with four-year compulsory education for boys and 
girls, likely based on the observation that in the advanced West both boys 
and girls were educated. As in the West at the time, education was seen 
as a way to impart useful skills, inculcate loyalty to the national state, and 
promote nationalism.62 As such, education was intimately linked with the 
overall Meiji project of attaining the “wealth and power” needed to 
survive in a hostile international system where the strong ate the weak. 
The focus on education by the Meiji government is important for two 
reasons. On the one hand, human capital formation plays an important and 
in fact critical role in long-term economic growth.63 On the other hand, 
the importance of education illustrates the transformative change that the 
Meiji leadership undertook. Japanese development strategy was not 
limited to importing any specific technique, technology, or body of 
science, as it was in nineteenth-century Khedivate Egypt.64 The Meiji 
initiative to transform Japan was rooted in the Iwakura Mission’s 
perception that the West’s “wealth and technological advances were the 
products of customs and institutions that were fundamentally different 
from those in China and Japan.”65 Beyond working on education, Meiji 
reformers also sought to transform the legal system. 
61. TAKAYOSHI KIDO, 2 KIDO TAKAYOSHI NIKKI: THE DIARY OF TAKAYOSHI KIDO 126–27
(1933) (see comment – page 54 in Irokawa). TAKAYOSHI KIDO, 4 KIDO TAKAYOSHI MONJO: THE 
PAPERS OF TAKAYOSHI KIDO 320 (1933) (see comment – page 55 in Irokawa ).  
62. MCCLAIN, MODERN HISTORY, supra note 56, at 179, 260–263. See generally EUGEN 
WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL FRANCE 1870–1914 (1976); 
JOHN BOLI, NEW CITIZENS FOR A NEW SOCIETY: THE INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF MASS SCHOOLING 
IN SWEDEN (1989); ANDY GREEN, EDUCATION AND STATE FORMATION: THE RISE OF EDUCATION 
SYSTEMS IN ENGLAND, FRANCE AND THE USA (1990); BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED 
COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2006).  
63. Barbara Sianesi & John Van Reenen, The Returns to Education: Macroeconomics, 17 J.
ECON. SURVS. 157, 157 (2003). 
64. DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE SO RICH
AND SOME SO POOR 403–07 (1999) (describing Egyptian attempts to develop a textile industry based 
on Jumel cotton by importing European mechanization). 
65. SAGERS, supra note 55, at 95.
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That law was fundamental to the functioning of a modern country 
and its economy was not a hard argument to make in nineteenth-century 
Japan. Impersonal law66 (before which everyone was equal)67 
administrated by a meritocratic bureaucracy in a highly centralized state 
has deep roots in Chinese and Japanese political theory, thought, and 
practice.68 However, law was primarily administrative and used “to 
maintain power and policy.”69 It was seen as an “instrument for the 
complete control of all citizens by the government; punishments were 
made severe enough to have exemplary effect upon the whole people; 
stern surveillance over the feudal barons and people insured peace and 
order; and government control was applied to economic activities.”70 In 
other words, the legal system filled a practical function by furthering the 
interests of a state. However, Japan’s legal system seemed arbitrary to 
Western observers, and Meiji reformers realized that Japan could not hope 
to revise the unequal treaties imposed upon it until the country, in the eyes 
of the West, “became a nation governed in accordance with rational 
laws.”71 A constitution and legal system more recognizable by the West 
were needed, and both were cobbled together largely using foreign 
models.72 Japan has a civil law system because this framework is easier to 
implement from scratch. The civil code was modeled on both German and 
French law,73 while its commercial code was largely inspired by German 
example.74 
The first patent law was created in 1871, several years before the 
civil and commercial codes were finalized, but it was considered a failure 
and quickly abolished.75 The promulgation of the law became a priority 
because a patent system in general—and definitely one like the United 
States’—was seen as critical not necessarily to reward inventors, but to 
66. VICTORIA TIN-BOR HUI, WAR AND STATE-FORMATION IN ANCIENT CHINA AND EARLY 
MODERN EUROPE 103 (2005). 
67. Id. at 172.
68. Kia-Ngau Chang, The Influence of Legalism Upon Japanese Government and Economy.
3&4 TSING HUA J. CHINESE STUD. 1 (1963). Cf. SAGERS, supra note 55. 
69. Dan Fenno Henderson, Evolution of Tokugawa Law, in STUDIES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN JAPAN 214 (John W. Hall & Marius B. Jansen eds., 1968). 
70. Chang, supra note 68, at 10.
71. MCCLAIN, MODERN HISTORY, supra note 56, at 185.
72. JOSEPH PITTAU, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EARLY MEIJI JAPAN, 1868-1889 131–157 (1967);
Daikichi Irokawa. The Impact of Western Culture. in CULTURE OF THE MEIJI PERIOD 56–58 (1985). 
73. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 113–17 (3d ed. 2009).
74. Tomotaka Fujita, The Commercial Code in Japan, in 2 CODIFICATION IN EAST ASIA:
SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 2ND IACL THEMATIC CONFERENCE 122 (Wen-Yeu Wang ed., 2014); 
ODA, supra note 73, at 117. 
75. Tom Nicholas & Hiroshi Shimizu, Intermediary Functions and the Market for Innovation
in Meiji and Taishō Japan, 87 BUS. HIST. REV. 121, 136 (2013). 
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encourage innovation.76 In 1885, a new patent law was promulgated, and 
the ministry that would one day become MITI (rather than the Ministry of 
Justice) was given responsibility for patents. While Japan had bilateral 
treaties with a limited number of countries, it waited until 1899 to join the 
Paris Convention, which allowed foreigners to patent in Japan.77 In 1899 
Japan also joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. This is, of course, similar to the United States’ pattern of 
not extending intellectual property protection to foreigners until quite late. 
To no small degree, joining these conventions was part of the larger Meiji 
project of having the country be released from “semicolonial status” and 
reaching “acceptance into the comity of great powers.”78 
Already by the early twentieth century, there was a well-functioning 
domestic market for patents, suggesting a well-ordered system.79 
Furthermore, not only did American companies such as General Electric 
register thousands of patents in Japan, Japanese innovations were 
frequently patented in the United States.80 By the middle of the 1880s, 
patents per capita in Japan were rising rapidly, and over the course of forty 
years, Japan went from 0.6 percent of the United States’ figure to 15 
percent.81 Meiji-era investments in education and innovation paid quick 
dividends, with increasing licensing of patents by Japanese to foreign 
companies and significant independent technical advances.82 In a 
qualitative and quantitative study examining “the role of domestic 
inventive activity versus international transfers of knowledge,” Tom 
Nicholas finds extensive support for “the idea of a dynamic Japanese 
innovation sector,” and for the idea that “Japanese inventors drove the 
level and structure of inventive activity towards that observed in 
technologically advanced nations.”83 In other words, in the pre-war 
period, the Japanese patent system was considered reliable by foreign 
companies. Far from simply reimplementing Western technology, 
Japanese companies were able to innovate independently. 
In Japan, given the apparently good evidence for support for 
intellectual property protection and more significantly production, the 
76. Id. at 135–36.
77. Id. at 137.
78. MCCLAIN, MODERN HISTORY, supra note 56, at 283.
79. Nicholas & Shimizu, supra note 75.
80. Shigehiro Nishimura, International Patent Control and Transfer of Knowledge: The
United States and Japan Before World War II, 9 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 1, 9 (2011). 
81. Nicholas & Shimizu, supra note 75, at 130.
82. Id. at 132.
83. Tom Nicholas, The Origins of the Japanese Technological Modernization, 48
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 272, 288 (2011). 
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overall picture of protection and infringement is muddled by the post-war 
complaints of widespread patent infringement and “unfair competition.”84 
John Lindgren and Craig Yudell stated in 1994: 
According to recent Tokyo press reports, the United States and Japan 
are once again at war–this time, though, it is a “Patent War.” Over the 
last decade, American companies have become extremely aggressive in 
seeking worldwide protection from infringement of their intellectual 
property. American corporations have recently focused their efforts on 
the high-tech companies of Japan. These American companies have 
gone beyond asserting U.S. patents against imports of Japanese 
companies in the United States and are now actively pursuing patent 
protection against Japanese companies in Japan itself. Those Japanese 
companies, of course, are responding in kind, spending large amounts 
of money and labor on patent acquisition, both in Japan and in the United 
States.85 
The authors present clear examples of what can perhaps charitably be 
called questionable behavior by Japanese companies and by the Japanese 
patent office, chief among which is the thirty-year processing time for 
Texas Instruments’ Kilby patent of the integrated circuit.86 This respite 
allowed Japan to develop its own semiconductor industry. That is not to 
say that the delay was a complete loss for Texas Instruments. Being 
awarded a patent in 1989, as opposed to 1959, proved lucrative to the 
company because Japan’s semiconductor industry was by the late 1980s 
several orders of magnitudes larger than it had been in the late 1950s, and 
the company’s royalties were correspondingly larger.87 
Given the technical proficiency and innovativeness of Japanese 
industry before the war, it seems unlikely that Japanese infringement was 
as widespread as claimed in the American press. More likely is perhaps 
that while Japan had massive production capacity (a high capacity for 
innovation especially in the reductions of cost and complexity) but 
comparatively little intellectual property, the United States at the time had 
less production capacity (was less able or willing to produce at low cost) 
but had comparatively more intellectual property.88 In retrospect, it would 
seem that patents were wielded by American companies, and by extension 
84. See Robert B. Reich, Is Japan Out to Get Us?, N.Y. TIMES para. 5 (Feb. 9, 1992),
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/09/books/is-japan-out-to-get-us.html [https://perma.cc/G4PS-
Y7RT]. 
85. Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 15, at 2.
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 4.
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the American government, to negate the Japanese later-mover advantage 
in high technology. 
Over the course of the 1990s, headlines about Japanese-American 
patent wars disappeared when Japan entered its Lost Decade (a decade-
long period of economic stagnation following the collapse of an asset 
bubble). Increasing competition from other East Asian economies 
coincided with the ability of the United States to take a commanding lead 
in the computer revolution, which included companies like IBM, Intel, 
Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Dell, and Apple leveraging the unique 
innovation pipeline of Silicon Valley.89 With the acquisition and 
production of vast amounts of intellectual property (not least the 
copyrighted material owned and produced by the film and music studios 
that were bought by Japanese companies), Japan in the 1990s found itself 
like the United States before it with less and less production capacity 
relative to the rapidly expanding value of its intellectual property.90 After 
a decade of antagonism, the Japanese and United States governments 
began cooperating on strengthening intellectual property protection 
domestically as well as internationally. Later-mover Japan had by the 
1990s become an earlier-mover relative to the rest of East Asia in general, 
and to China in particular. 
C. Intellectual Property and Development in China 
While 2018 saw the fortieth anniversary of the beginning of the 
Opening Up and Reform Era in China, it also witnessed the anniversary 
of another series of policies that were in some ways more consequential, 
the 1898 Hundred Days of Reform. Thirty years after Japan’s Meiji 
Restoration, China’s Qing Dynasty began its own (eventually aborted) 
attempts to self-strengthen.91 Those ultimately failed to have an effect, 
with the emperor who initiated them de facto deposed, and with key 
would-be reformers punished. The continued dynastic decline and popular 
hardship set off an increasingly frantic search for a solution to China’s 
travails. As miseries multiplied, intellectuals became ready to jettison any 
knowledge or traditional practice that did not promote the national 
imperative of restoring China’s wealth and power. As had been the case 
in Japan, regardless of provenance, any knowledge or practice that had 
89. See generally Samuelson, supra note 16.
90. Sadao Nagaoka, Determinants of High-Royalty Contracts and the Impact of Stronger
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Japan, 19 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECONS. 233, 235 (2005). 
91. Shiping Hua, The Meiji Restoration (1868) and the Late Qing Reform (1898) Revisited:
Strategies and Philosophies, 21 EAST ASIA 3, 6 (2004). 
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practical value would be adopted.92 While Japan had seemed a promising 
model to many, in the end the Soviet Union’s anti-imperialism and 
success in “turning a poor agrarian economy into an industrial 
powerhouse” made communism the more attractive model to China.93 
In the early twentieth century, for many poor countries the model of 
the Soviet Union seemed to offer the fastest method for achieving wealth 
and power. The acceptance of Marxist-Leninism was in the case of China 
never slavish, and Chinese leadership has been willing to learn from 
foreign and domestic94 examples and experiments. Like Japan, China 
made full use of the later-mover advantage as it used, experimented with, 
and implemented social, economic, and political reforms.  
The first thirty years of the new republic saw massive basic 
infrastructure investments, human capital formation, and the creation of a 
manufacturing base. While these investments all became important for the 
explosive economic growth in the last decades of the twentieth century,95 
the human capital investments of earlier decades played a particularly 
large role.96 China had begun the twentieth century with one of the lowest 
literacy rates among twenty to twenty-four year olds, and by the time of 
the Opening Up and Reform Era, it had (among the young) literacy rates 
similar to those of the West.97 By the time of the Reform Era, Chinese 
labor was cheap (as in low-cost, but highly qualified) compared to other 
developing countries outside of East Asia. 
92. ORVILLE SCHELL & JOHN DELURY, WEALTH AND POWER: CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY loc. 80–108 (2013) (ebook). 
93. NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE: MODERNIZATION THEORY IN COLD WAR 
AMERICA 42 (2003). 
94. Cf. Sebastian Heilmann, Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise, 43 STUD.
COMP. INT’L DEV. 1 (2008). 
95. Y. Y. Kueh, The Maoist Legacy and China’s New Industrialization Strategy, 119 CHINA 
Q. 420, 422 (1989). 
96. JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, INDIA: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL
OPPORTUNITY 73–75 (1995). See also Amartya Sen, Passage to China, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 2, 
2004), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/12/02/passage-to-china/ [https://perma.cc/4ZJF-
K7DZ]; Amartya Sen, What China Could Teach India, Then and Now, ASIA SOC’Y (Feb. 17, 2005), 
https://asiasociety.org/amartya-sen-what-china-could-teach-india-then-and-now 
[https://perma.cc/VT58-55TQ]. 
97. Ottervik, supra note 3.
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Figure 4. Regional Economic Growth in China 1954–2014 
In terms of economic growth, the significant difference between the 
pre- and post-Reform Era was stability of growth, and not the absence or 
presence of growth itself. The average yearly economic growth rate 
between 1953 and 1978 was 6.5%; between 1978 and 2008 this number 
was 9.9%. Either number puts China in line with the economic growth of 
the rest of East Asia in the same time period. The significant difference 
between the two time periods was that before 1978, economic growth 
rates were subject to wild swings, with a 50% difference between peaks 
and troughs, while later economic growth was more stable and 
predictable.98 These swings were the most violent in the first twenty years, 
and from the end of the 1960s, GDP per capita grew consistently. As 
shown in Figure 4, the apparent lack of economic growth before the 
Reform and Opening Up Era is largely a product of the scale of the 
cumulative post-Reform economic growth.99 While GDP per capita for 
any year might be arguable, the trend is congruent with improvements in 
98. Shaoguang Wang, Steadfastly Maintain Our Direction and Explore New Roads: Sixty
Years of Socialist Practice in China, 31 SOC. SCI. CHINA 21, 29 (2010). 
99. CHINA DATA ONLINE, https://www.china-data-online.com/ [https://perma.cc/8K8A-
HCMR]. 
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education, health, and agricultural productivity.100 Furthermore, as argued 
by Amartya Sen and others, the economic growth of China is the product, 
not the driver, of human capital investments made over long periods of 
time. China chose a development strategy that, in broad strokes, was not 
too dissimilar from that of the rest of East Asia, which is to say significant 
upfront investments in education, agricultural productivity, and economic 
equality, with largely similar long-term results—high economic growth. 
Unlike China’s economic development, China’s modern legal 
system is a more recent phenomenon. At the foundation of the People’s 
Republic, large parts of the country had been outside the control of the 
central government for decades. State-building—along with the 
construction of a legal system—was a critical task for the new 
government. The first decade of the new republic was largely one of 
institutionalization and legalization, with the promulgation of the first 
constitution in 1954, and with the building of a judicial system. The 1960s 
and early 1970s, by contrast, saw extensive deinstitutionalization and 
deprofessionalization.101 By the 1980s, two-thirds of all judges lacked law 
degrees, and before the 1995 Judges’ Law, “judges in China were not 
treated as legal professionals.”102 The reason why such a small percentage 
of judges had a formal judicial education was that the newly reopened 
“Ministry of Justice announced in 1982 that no less than 57,000 
‘outstanding army officers’ [were] given [abbreviated] legal training, 
prior to being assigned to the court system.”103 These judges were 
complemented by about 200,000 “judicial workers” who were to serve as 
what might be called “barefoot” lawyers.104 
In China, as in Japan, rule by law is a tradition with long roots, and 
the judicial system filled primarily an administrative as opposed to a 
judicial function.105 After 1995, the judicial system was quickly 
professionalized, and “[t]he proportion of judges holding [legal] degrees 
 100.  See generally Chris Bramall, Origins of the Agricultural “Miracle”: Some Evidence from 
Sichuan, 143 CHINA Q. 731 (1995); Zhun Xu, The Chinese Agriculture Miracle Revisited, 47 ECON. 
& POL. WKLY. 51 (2012). 
 101.  Kam C. Wong, The Police Legitimacy Crisis and Police Law Reform in China: Part I, 6 
INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 199, 206 (2004). 
 102.  Weixia Gu, Courts in China: Judiciary in the Economic and Societal Transitions, in ASIAN 
COURTS IN CONTEXT 495 (Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014). 
103.  JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 705 (1990). 
 104.  Id. (“Barefoot” refers to the “barefoot doctors,” individuals who during the 1960s received 
medical training, but not a degree, and then traveled from village to village to tend to medical needs.). 
 105.  Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF. (March/April 1998), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1998-03-01/rule-law-revival [https://perma.cc/4P6Z-TTSG] 
(distinguishing rule by law from rule of law); Gu, supra note 102, at 487. 
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increased from 7 percent in 1995 to 56 percent in 2006.”106 For the first 
decades after the Opening Up and Reform Era, China was, for most intents 
and purposes, without a recognizable judicial system. In the years leading 
up to and following China’s accession to the WTO, the government made 
strenuous efforts to provide broader legal training, but the relationship 
between judicial and administrative power in China will be complex for 
the foreseeable future.107 
As was the case in Japan some 110 years previously, a discussion of 
the role of patents in economic development had taken place before the 
creation of a modern legal system in China.108 A law protecting the 
proprietary rights of an inventor had been promulgated in the early 1950s, 
but it was superseded in 1963 by new regulations which emphasized the 
importance of freely sharing information.109 In 1978, the rights of an 
individual inventor were once again recognized, but the tension between 
individual reward and social benefit created extensive debate.110 
Just like in Japan a century earlier, the patent system was seen as a 
means to promote invention, rather than reward individual inventors; 
inventors received a limited monopoly as remuneration for their work or 
“distribution according to labor.”111 A patent was seen as a relative right, 
not an absolute one, and the 1984 Patent Law suggested that “not only is 
the patentee obligated to work the patent, but the government may grant 
a compulsory license to a party who exhibits a need to make use of the 
patented technology.”112 Similar to patents, trademarks were first legally 
regulated in China in the early 1950s. Exclusive use was abolished in 1963 
to make trademarks into signifiers of quality rather than source 
indicators.113 A 1981 analysis found that the 1963 regulations had largely 
not succeeded in safe-guarding quality, and by 1982 a new Trademark 
Law was promulgated, encouraging manufacturers to grow sales and 
profits by developing consumer demand for their products.114 
The purpose of the 1984 Patent Law was manifold: in the (then-) near 
term, to encourage knowledge transfer by foreign companies by offering 
106.  Gu, supra note 102, at 503 (citations omitted). 
 107.  Jerome Alan Cohen, China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, 2 FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 
23 (2006). 
108.  L. Mark Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on China’s New Patent and Trademark Laws, 6 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 86, 88 (1984). 
109.  Id. at 89–90. 
110.  Id. at 90, 93. 
111.  Id. at 94 (citations omitted). 
112.  Id. at 95. 
113.  Id. at 111. 
114.  Id. at 112–13. 
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them intellectual property protection; in the medium term, to encourage 
domestic invention and innovation; and in the very long term, to ensure 
reciprocal protection and guard Chinese intellectual property from 
expropriation by foreigners.115 Intellectual property protection in China 
was then, as had been the case in Japan, not something imposed from the 
outside, but rather chosen for its instrumental value. Foreign pressure to 
strengthen intellectual property protection played a role for its 
development, but the domestic factors behind the strengthening of 
intellectual property protection were numerous.116 
Hand-in-hand with China’s economic development, strengthening of 
domestic (and increasingly exported) brands, and investments in (plus 
returns to) domestic research and development, China has joined 
international intellectual property treaties.117 Initially a quiescent 
observer, China has become increasingly active in international 
organizations, and has established bilateral relations in the same way the 
United States and the European Union have.118 
The Trump Administration’s complaints of rampant intellectual 
property infringement by China119 are largely the same as U.S. complaints 
during the 1980s: “During the 1980s and 1990s, the United States 
repeatedly threatened China with economic sanctions, trade wars, 
nonrenewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).”120 As discussed above, 
for most of this period China was without a judicial system comparable to 
that found in the West. U.S. and Western complaints of intellectual 
property infringement were not hard sells in China because strong 
intellectual property protection was seen as fundamental for long-term 
economic growth throughout the Reform Era. In 2006 President Hu Jintao 
remarked that “the building of China’s system of intellectual property 
right [sic] and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, 
management, protection and application regarding intellectual property 
are our urgent need [sic] for the purpose of enhancing independent and 
self-driven innovation capabilities and building an innovation-oriented 
country.”121 In other words, intellectual property production and 
protection were seen by the top leadership as critical to China’s future 
115.  Id. at 91–92. 
116.  See generally Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 17.  
117.  Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L 
L. 209, 222 (2011). 
118.  Id. at 223–50. 
119.  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 2. 
120.  Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 17, at 529. 
121.  Id. at 530. 
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economic development. Ten years later, strengthening intellectual 
property rights was a key part of Made in China 2025,122 China’s now-
downplayed industrial policy.123 
As shown above in Figure 2, China’s policy to increase intellectual 
property production has borne fruit as trademark and patent applications 
by Chinese entities have surpassed those of American or Japanese entities. 
While the quality of some (or even many) of the patents might be 
debatable, what is important is that in high tech (as shown by strategic 
patenting124), a large quantity of patents has a quality all of its own. A 
large patent portfolio protects against legal aggression by competitors, and 
Chinese companies are building large patent portfolios for their 
protection.125 Just like Japanese companies, in response to U.S. 
intellectual property suits, began to acquire and develop their own 
considerable arsenal of intellectual property—if for no other reason than 
as a defense—Chinese companies now seem to be doing the same. Given 
the accelerating rate at which Chinese companies are accumulating 
patents, this will likely have significant consequences over time in that 
China could become as enthusiastic an enforcer of its intellectual property 
rights overseas as the United States and Japan have been in the recent past. 
IV. ANALYSIS
In the decades immediately after the Second World War, “Made in 
Japan” was considered a bit of a joke and a signifier of poor or inferior 
quality. However, that changed in the 1980s when highly competitive 
Japanese car and consumer electronics manufacturers made headway in 
the global and American market. A veritable cottage industry of books 
critical of Japan and unfair Japanese competition sprung up overnight,126 
 122.  ST. COUNCIL OF CHINA (中华人民共和国国务院), NOTICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON 
PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTING “MADE IN CHINA 2025” (国务院关于印发《中国制造2025》的通知
) (May 19, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm [https://
perma.cc/Y5Y7-LV4C]. See also U.S. Chamber of Com., Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions 
Built on Local Protections (2017). 
 123.  Sidney Leng & Yangpeng Zhen, Beijing Tries to Play Down ‘Made in China 2025’ as 
Donald Trump Escalates Trade Hostilities, S. CHINA MORNING POST para. 1 (Sept. 29, 2018), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2152422/beijing-tries-play-down-made-
china-2025-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/Z4JE-2T9S]. 
 124.  Dietmar Harhoff et al., The Strategic Use of Patents and Its Implications for Enterprise 
and Competition Policies, ESMT BERLIN REP. (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/
documents/3427/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf [https://perma.cc/7DKS-PTCP]. 
 125.  See, e.g., Charles Clover, Xiaomi to Buy 1,500 Patents from Microsoft, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 1, 
2016) https://www.ft.com/content/9ecc1416-27c9-11e6-8b18-91555f2f4fde [https://perma.cc/
MEF3-MEWZ]. 
126.  Cf. Reich, supra note 84. 
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and U.S. presidential candidates openly mused about whether Americans 
would be reduced to sweeping the dust from around Japanese 
computers.127 
By the 1990s, some of the fear of a Japanese takeover had subsided 
as investments made decades earlier paid dividends in the United States 
in the form of the (American) personal computer revolution, and Japan 
entered its Lost Decade in the aftermath of the collapse of an asset-price 
bubble.128 By the late 1980s, Japan found itself with an earlier-mover 
advantage in many industries and was facing increasing competition from 
later-movers, especially perhaps from South Korean companies. 
Furthermore, Japanese companies had acquired significant stakes in film 
and music studios with global sales, and therefore had an incentive to 
safeguard intellectual property rights globally. With more intellectual 
property to protect, Japan became, like the United States before it, an 
enthusiastic supporter of an international intellectual property regime. 
China (whose pillorying by American policymakers and media 
arguably resembles that meted out to Japan some decades earlier) now 
seems to be in a similar transition as precipitous rises in the production of 
intellectual property have been accompanied by increasingly robust 
intellectual property protection, and enforcement of that protection. China 
appears to be following the path trod by the United States and Japan to 
become a serious defender of intellectual property rights. From the 
examples of the United States, Japan, and China, it seems that whether a 
country chooses to infringe on versus protect intellectual property 
depends on the relative value they perceive in the two. This has 
implications for earlier-movers, like the United States, which perceive 
themselves to have an edge over apparent competitors in the area of 
intellectual property. Specifically, the creation of an intellectual property 
regime that protects earlier-movers from later-movers could be 
problematic for countries like the United States if the roles are ever 
reversed. If the hierarchy of movers shifts, the relative interest in 
intellectual property enforcement will as well, and China could seek to 
protect its goods against infringement by a future later-mover such as the 
United States and/or Japan someday. 
The change that has already occurred in China’s stance is not 
surprising considering that the widespread international outsourcing of 
manufacturing has made intellectual property a key asset for its private 
 127.  James Reston, Mondale’s Tough Line, N.Y. TIMES. para. 4 (Oct. 13, 1982), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/13/opinion/washington-mondale-s-tough-line.html 
[https://perma.cc/42CK-FTZ8].  
128.  Samuelson, supra note 16. 
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companies, strengthening the general tendencies of earlier-movers to 
formulate and demand enforcement of strict intellectual property laws. 
Because Chinese companies like Huawei, Lenovo, and Xiaomi (along 
with many others) now have valuable brands and intellectual property of 
their own, it was only to be expected that China’s intellectual property 
regime would be toughened. This is not to say that China’s leadership was 
previously insensitive to the importance of intellectual property for the 
functioning of a modern economy. As discussed above, a patent law was 
implemented in the early days of reform, before there was a modern or 
even recognizably functioning judicial system. The law had been debated 
for years and was implemented to promote China’s technological and 
economic development.129 This would suggest that countries like China 
respond not only to exogenous pressure from earlier-movers like the 
United States and Japan to increase intellectual property protection, but 
also to internal motivations. 
While the focus of this analysis is on intellectual property, it should 
be noted that the most critical knowledge transfer to Japan and China 
involved not proprietary knowledge, but rather institutions. When the 
United States pilfered the intellectual property and proprietary knowledge 
of European entities (whether it was private companies wantonly 
reprinting the works of British authors or the government encouraging 
illicit transfer of knowledge through migration of engineers),130 the U.S. 
had a largely similar institutional framework as its European victims.131 
Western countries shared some form of rule of law, near-universal 
education, high levels of gender equality implicated in development,132 
and an Enlightenment heritage. The differences that existed between 
Western countries paled in comparison to the difference between any 
given Western country and nineteenth-century later-movers like Japan, 
129.  Wu-Ohlson, supra note 108, at 91–92. 
 130.  See generally Bingchun Meng, Property Right or Development Strategy?: Protection of 
Foreign Copyright in 19th Century America and Contemporary China, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & 
POL. SCI. (2007) https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/93515.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LZN-QB9B]; Kat 
Eschner, How Industrial Espionage Started America’s Cotton Revolution, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 
20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/how-industrial-espionage-started-
americas-cotton-revolution-180967608/#38rtqhFr6EAO7lkA.99 [https://perma.cc/827Y-MZ57]. 
 131.  See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to 
Acquire Them, 35 STUDS. IN COMP. INT’L DEV. 3 (2000). 
 132.  WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT: THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, 
RESOURCES, AND VOICE 73–106 (2001), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
512911468327401785/pdf/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/UU5G-QC5B]. 
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China, or Turkey. Once committed to development, Japan and China 
transformed their social, political, and economic institutions.133 
Both Japan and China show how later-movers have an advantage vis-
à-vis earlier-movers; can learn from the successes and failures of earlier-
movers; and—through selection and adaptation of development policy, 
institutions, and technology—can catch up to earlier-movers. For 
policymakers who are interested in long-term economic competitiveness, 
it would therefore be worthwhile to look beyond the immediate problems 
of intellectual property infringement to better understand the policies that 
support the political, economic, and scientific development of an 
“unfairly” competing country. As Japan and China found early on, 
copying current technology has little long-term value by itself. What they 
needed and what they implemented for their development were the 
institutions that would allow them to innovate and produce their own 
intellectual property. 
The patterns that apply to successful developers such as the United 
States, Japan, and China might not hold universally. What is suggested by 
the experience of these countries, however, is that there is a relationship 
between earlier-/later-mover status and intellectual property protection. A 
larger sample of countries is needed to determine whether or not this 
relationship is universal. Even without a larger sample, it can probably 
safely be said that intellectual property infringement per se is not a 
shortcut to long-term economic development. All three countries 
discussed here first had or built the institutions and human capital needed 
for innovation, and this allowed them to absorb and build off of transferred 
knowledge. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The examples of the United States, Japan, and China suggest that 
countries’ views about and willingness to enact as well as vigorously 
enforce intellectual property laws may track their level of not just absolute 
but also relative economic development. These countries saw rapid 
economic growth by first identifying and then building the human and 
physical infrastructure needed to sustain growth, and then selectively (by 
means fair and foul) learning from other countries. When the edge 
regarding useful intellectual property lay with others, these countries 
tended to (or at least were perceived to) inadequately protect the 
intellectual property of more developed countries. As later-mover 
 133.  See generally MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (2000); SPENCE, supra 
note 103. 
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countries developed, their intellectual property laws also became 
increasingly comprehensive. These countries additionally became more 
likely to enforce their intellectual property internationally. With economic 
growth, countries that previously acted as industrial spies and infringers 
of others’ intellectual property seem to become stalwart defenders and 
maintainers of (their own) intellectual property rights. 
The implication of the above is likely that in the long run, while 
intellectual property protection is important, production is equally if not 
more important. It is not protection of intellectual property alone that will 
allow any country to maintain an edge vis-à-vis other countries. Nor is 
past innovation likely to be of much use in the future unless it is 
continually built upon. Long-term economic competitiveness appears to 
be predicated on a capacity to develop new science and technologies. That 
capacity is likely a product of institutional frameworks. To the extent that 
a country overemphasizing protection of its old intellectual property 
distracts it from an examination of the policy initiatives that catapult later-
movers to be able to compete (unfairly or not) with earlier-movers, that 
emphasis could prove to be highly disadvantageous to it in the long term. 
Taking a longer perspective on the protection of intellectual property 
rights and the role they play in the development of earlier-movers and 
later-movers suggests that while these rights are important, they implicate 
several policy areas and should not be considered in isolation. As 
demonstrated by the cases of Japan and China, rapid development is a 
multi-faceted process, requiring study and coordination of social and 
economic policy. It would stand to reason that competing with, or keeping 
pace with, a rapid developer would require the same effort. In 2012, Peter 
Yu hinted at the possibility that “[t]he changing dynamics in the global 
economy and the improved technological capabilities in China therefore 
could result in a role reversal.”134 The years since that statement, and the 
developments in the U.S. and Chinese political landscapes, may engender 
this result faster than might have been predicted. 
134.  Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 17, at 556. 
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